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COMMENT I
LIABILITY OF INSURANCE COMPANY FOR FAILURE
TO SETTLE
Where an insurance company has the opportunity and fails to settle a
claim against its insured within the limits of a liability or indemnity policy,
or in excess of the policy limits where the insured agrees to supply the excess,
and a verdict and judgment are subsequently rendered in excess of the
proposed settlement amount, does the insured have any rights against the
insurer? The purpose of this Comment is to analyze this question in light of
Pennsylvania law and to resolve what the basis or bases for determining
liability should be.
The problem is illustrated by the leading case, Cowden v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co.,' involving a truck of the insured which caught fire. When the
driver stopped on the highway to attempt to extinguish the fire, an auto-
mobile driven by Latham crashed into the truck. Phillips, a passenger in
Latham's automobile who was injured in the crash, claimed he had warned
Latham of the stopped truck. An action instituted by Phillips was tried
three times. The first resulted in a mistrial before all the evidence was
presented. At the second trial, a verdict of $100,000 was rendered against
Latham and the insured jointly, which verdict was set aside and a new
trial granted. During the third trial the insured's personal counsel had an
opportunity to settle the claim for $45,000, which amount he felt could be
supplied in the following manner: $10,000, that being Latham's insurance
coverage; $10,000, which the insured would contribute; and $25,000, which
represented the policy limit of insured's coverage. The company rejected the
proposal because it felt that any negligence of its insured was not the proxi-
mate cause of the accident. The final trial ended with a $90,000 verdict which
the insured settled for $80,000.
Relying solely on bad faith,2 the insured then brought an action against
his insurer for the loss which he had suffered because of the latter's refusal to
settle. He received a verdict for the full amount claimed, which was nullified
by a judgment n.o.v. for the defendant company. The court held that the
evidence was insufficient to justify a finding of bad faith on the part of the
insurer for its refusal to settle the claim against the insured.
There are two principal tests which are applied to determine an
insurer's liability in such a case: the "bad faith" test and the "negligence"
1. 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d 224 (1957).
2. Id. at 462, 134 A.2d at 224.
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test.3 Although Cowden would seem to suggest that Pennsylvania imposes
the more difficult burden of proving bad faith on the part of the insurer in
failing to settle,4 the fact is that the Pennsylvania courts have never had an
opportunity to choose between the two tests. Cowden was a case of first
impression,5 yet the insured, for some unknown reason, chose to rest
his entire case on a theory of bad faith on the part of the insurer. Agreeing
with the lower court that the plaintiff had simply failed to prove his allega-
tion of bad faith, the supreme court was careful to point out that it was
not adopting this test as the rule of decision in Pennsylvania. The court
stated: "Nor is it without presently material significance that the plaintiff
does not assert that the defendant's conduct was fraudulent or even negligent;
and, of course, bad judgment, if alleged, would not have been actionable."
In order to evaluate the respective merits of the bad faith and negligence
tests, it becomes necessary to determine the relationship between the insurer
and the insured. The answers to such questions as the following all depend
on the nature of the relationship. To what degree should the insurer consider
the interests of the insured? Must the insurer always give the insured's
interests paramount consideration? To what extent will the actions of the
insurer in dealings affecting the insured be subjected to scrutiny? Should
there be an absolute duty to settle?
In the Cowden case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
While the contract is primarily one of indemnity, it operates at
thesame time to create an agency relationship in its provision
. f6r the insurer's exercise of control over the disposition of claims
against the insured (within the policy's limits) whether that be by
settlement or litigation.
7
The opinion also mentions that even though the interests of insurer and
insured may be substantially hostile, especially in situations where neither
settlement nor verdict can lie within policy limits, the fiduciary obligations of
the insurer remain undiminished. In fact, in such cases, the insurer is obligated
to exercise the utmost good faith in handling claims against the insured. It has
been recognized that Pennsylvania courts impose a high degree of good faith
upon the insurer's counsel. This is especially true in defense work.8 In the
3. See annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168 (1955).
4. Indeed, in "APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4712, at 564 (1962),
the Cowden case is the sole authority for the author's assertion that Pennsylvania
has adopted the bad faith test in this situation.
5. 389 Pa. at 468, 134 A.2d at 227.
6. Id. at 472, 134 A.2d at 229.
7. Id. at 469-70, 134 A.2d at 228.
8. See Weiner v. Targan, 100 Pa. Super. 278 (1930); see also Perkoski v.
Wilson, 371 Pa. 553, 92 A.2d 189 (1952) ;.Malley v. American Indem. Co., 297 Pa.
216, 146 Atl. 571 (1929).
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case of Malley v. American Indem. Co.,9 the court specifically mentioned
that this duty is placed upon the company in order to prevent an insurer
from "play[ing] fast and loose, taking a chance in the hope of winning . . .-1
Notwithstanding these generalizations intended to emphasize the insurer's
fiduciary obligations to its insured, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
clearly indicated that there is no absolute duty placed upon the insurer to
settle claims against the insured. In Schmidt v. Travelers Ins. Co.," the
court said that "the insurer was under no obligation to pay in advance of
trial and the decision whether to settle or to try was left to its discretion."'
12
However, this does not mean that the company is permitted to act unreason-
ably or arbitrarily with respect to the interests of the insured. In the case of
American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. G. A. Nichols Co.,"3 recovery was permitted
under the bad faith rule, even where the company provided in its policy
that
no action shall lie against the Company for penalty because of the
refusal or failure of the Company to pay or satisfy any demands or
offers of settlement, whether made before or after judgment, even
though such demands or offers of settlement be within the Limits of
Liability provided herein.1
4
The cases which have adopted the negligence approach, while realizing
that the company is a party to the contract in addition to being a mere agent,
nevertheless fix a duty on the insurer to employ the ordinary care of a
prudent man in all its actions which involve the insured." Dictum in the
Cowden case suggests that, whenever the 'interests of the insured and
insurer become substantially hostile, "it becomes all the more apparent that
the insurer must act with the utmost good faith toward the insured in dis-
9. Supra note 8.
10. Id. at 224, 146 Ati. at 573.
11. 244 Pa. 286, 90 Atl. 653 (1914).
12. Id. at 289, 90 Ati. at 654; accord, Noshey v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 68
F.2d 808, 809-10 (6th Cir. 1934), wherein the court stated:
Nor within the policy limits has the insurer any contract obligation to effect
settlement, as the policy contains no promise that it will do so under any and
all conditions or circumstances, and none is to be implied, and beyond the
policy limits the insurer has of course no authority to bind the assured by
compromise in any amount whatsoever.
The rejection of an implied contract to settle seems proper, since such a term was
not agreed to or bargained for as a part of the contract. Even though the law favors
settlement, a policy agreement should be accepted as an integrated contract, and such
a provision should not be read into it.
13. 173 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1949).
14. Id. at 833. The court interpreted "penalty," as used in the exculpatory pro-
vision, to mean some sort of extraordinary liability as distinguished from compensation.
15. See Weymer v. Belle Plaine Broom Co., 151 Iowa 541, 132 N.W. 27 (1911);
but cf. Smith v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 227 Ky. 120, 12 S.W.2d 276 (1928)
(mistaken judgment is not negligence).
1963]
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posing of claims against the latter." '16 It would seem that a standard of "utmost
good faith" would lend itself to a theory of recovery based on negligence; as
yet, however, no standard of ordinary prudence or due care has been imposed
upon an insurer in Pennsylvania for a failure to settle. Should such a standard
be espoused? This question cannot be intelligently approached without an
understanding of the evolution of the bad faith test.
One of the leading cases establishing the bad faith test was decided by
the New York Court of Appeals in 1928.17 In that case the defendant was
insured against loss which would result if he were held liable for damages
accidentally suffered by his employees. In the course of negotiations, it became
apparent to the insurer that a settlement could be reached with the injured
employee for $8500. The insurer made a settlement offer of $6500. The insured
alleged that had he known of this situation, be would have contributed the
$2000 difference and the case could have been amicably settled. The court
held that if the insurer is to be held liable for not settling such cases, its
responsibility should be effected by agreement between insurer and insured
or by legislative enactment. In the landmark Rumford case' 8 generally cited
for this same proposition, the Supreme Court of Maine said:
It must be remembered, in the first place, that this policy of
insurance is a contract of indemnity, in which the parties have a
legal right to insert any conditions and stipulations which they
deem reasonable or necessary, provided no principle of public policy
is thereby contravened. 19
Some of the courts which have adopted the bad faith test hold that
only an intentional disregard of the interests of the insured will meet the
test. 20 Other courts do not seem to require such a strict standard to be
met. Nevertheless, it is recognized that these latter jurisdictions also follow
the bad faith test.21 The courts also appear to apply different standards re-
garding how closely the insurer should respect the interests of the insured,
especially where the interests of insurer and insured become adverse. Should
the insurer be permitted to consider its own interests even at the insured's
expense? Should the company's actions be judged by the standard that it
should dispose of the case as if it alone were to be liable for the entire
amount? It has been held that where an insurer does not settle, but decides
16. 389 Pa. at 470, 134 A.2d at 228.
17. Best Building Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 247 N.Y. 451, 160 N.E.
911 (1928).
18. Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 92 Me. 574, 43 Ati. 503
(1899).
19. Id. at 585, 43 Atl. at 506.
20. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 109 Vt. 481, 1 A.2d 817
(1938).
21. See, e.g., Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1939).
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to defend, reasonable care must be used in the preparation and conduct of
the trial. 22 Although it might be contended that an insurance company, as
a named defendant, would be at a decided disadvantage on all jury questions,
it should be pointed out that such a situation always obtains when any
defendant of substantial means appears in court. Yet, our traditional system
has not found this to be such an insurmountable obstacle as to justify
denying a remedy where the right is otherwise clear. In addition, the tradi-
tional safeguards of motions for directed verdict, judgment n.o.v., and new
trial are always available. The courts which require due care in negotiations
for settlement and in the conduct of the trial, but look for evidence of bad
faith in the company's decision whether or not to settle, have eased consid-
erably the burden of the insured. But why should anything less than reason-
able care be the recognized rule at any stage of the game, pre-decision,
decision, or trial?
It is submitted that the duty of reasonably prudent conduct should
extend to the settlement stage. It would seem that, since the insured has
vested such vast discretionary powers in the insurer, the latter should be
held to the requirements of due care in any event. The duty to settle would
be imposed, not absolutely, but when the circumstances indicate that settle-
ment is reasonable and appropriate. In the case of Cavanaugh Bros. v.
General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp.,23 the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire stated:
The question therefore raised . . . is whether [the insurer] . . .
owed the plaintiff the duty of settling . . . before suit, if that was
the reasonable thing to do. As to that there can be no question;
for, when the defendant assumed control of the . . . claim, it then
and there became its duty to do what the average man would do in
a similar situation.
24
This approach, it is submitted, represents the better reasoning, and should
be considered by the Pennsylvania courts at their first opportunity.
ANTHONY P. MOSES
22. Georgia Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447,46 S.W.2d 777 (1932).
23. 79 N.H. 186, 106 At. 604 (1919).
24. Id. at 187, 106 Atl. at 604 (emphasis added); see G. A. Stowers Furniture
Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
It is true that in the Cowden case there was a significant question whether or not
the insured's negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and hence whether
either insured or insurer was liable. However, it would seem that the company
should have appreciated the prophetic significance of the $100,000 jury verdict.
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